World Politics Review | Accountability for Mexico’s Ayotzinapa Massacre Won’t Come Easy

On Aug. 18, nearly eight years after 43 students from a teacher’s college in the rural town of Ayotzinapa disappeared, a truth commission set up by the government of Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador released a sprawling report that confirmed what many had long argued: The state was involved. The report is a step forward for victims’ families and others who had pushed to keep the case alive, despite efforts to bury it by the administration of former President Enrique Pena Nieto. But whether it will result in accountability remains to be seen.

The case dates back to September 2014, when the group went missing in the southern state of Guerrero. In the months that followed, Jesus Murillo Karam, the attorney general at the time, delivered the official version of events, dubbed the “historic truth”: The 43 students commandeered buses to attend a protest when local police detained them and turned them over to members of the Guerreros Unidos criminal group. The gang supposedly mistook them for rivals, killed them and incinerated their bodies in a garbage dump before tossing their remains into a river. Arrests were made. Case closed.

Except it wasn’t. Instead, Ayotzinapa—as it is known—became an open wound for Mexico and a turning point in what ended up being the scandal-ridden presidency of Pena Nieto. Independent investigators and journalists poked holes in the official version and uncovered the military’s involvement in surveillance and alterations made at the scene of the crime. Detained gang members and police officers were released due to mishandled evidence or signs of torture. Forensic evidence indicated that all the victims could not have been cremated together in the dump. Throughout it all, the students’ family members demanded to know what happened to their loved ones as protesters regularly organized under the rallying cry: “The state did it.”

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AS/COA Online | LatAm in Focus: Rewriting Mexico's Security and Energy Agendas

October opened up with big moves in areas high on Mexico’s agenda: security and energy. Both issues are among the most crucial to the country’s future.

On October 8, the Mexican capital played host to senior U.S. cabinet officials for a meeting that spelled the end of the 13-year-old, $3 billion security pact known as the Merida Initiative. A new agreement—with a rather lengthy name that commemorates 200 years of bilateral ties— was announced: the U.S. Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities. The two governments are slated to release a three-year plan for the Bicentennial Framework in January 2022. Until its release, the broad strokes of the meeting give a hint of how much will shift.

“For a lot of us who study U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, it feels more like a rebranding than a true change,” says Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, the head of a security research programs at the Center for U.S.-Mexican studies at the University of California, San Diego and the co-founder of the Mexico Violence Resource Project. She tells AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis that the announced agreement comes after a year of bumpy security relations, particularly following the U.S. arrest of Mexico’s former defense minister, Salvador Cienfuegos, in 2020. But she notes that during the Obama administration, cooperation had already moved on from focusing on narcotics to building rule of law and guaranteeing safe communities.

That doesn’t mean there weren’t shifts in priorities. The fact that Mexican officials emphasized gun smuggling and U.S. officials focused on fentanyl represents the need to tackle “twin tragedies,” says Farfán-Méndez, given the hundreds of thousands of homicides linked to Mexico’s drug war since it began 14 years ago and the approximately 90,000 overdose deaths in the United States in 2020. “I think that to the extent that both governments could show that they care about loss of life on the other side of the border, that that could really go a long way in getting working agreements between both countries,” Farfán-Méndez concludes.

And, while she says “the jury is still out” as to whether each country’s security agencies can resolve feuds under the new framework, the two sides are playing ball. “We're on first base now,” she says. “There's a lot of help that needs to happen from other teammates and in other areas to get things going. But I think, after going through innings with no real play, now we're at least on base.”

If security is a topic of cautious cooperation, energy is an area of discord. On October 1, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, or AMLO, introduced a constitutional reform that would give the state-owned electricity firm, CFE, control over 54 percent of the power market, effectively backpedaling on aspects of a 2013 reform that opened up Mexico’s energy sector to private and foreign investment. AMLO’s reform would also end the independence of the energy regulatory agencies by absorbing them into ministries and giving the government exclusive rights to lithium extraction.

Analysts and members of the business sector say the reform would endanger future private investment by canceling contracts and rebuilding a state monopoly. It would also risk international environmental agreements by favoring less efficient power generation resulting in an increase in prices for consumers. “One of the most important things that I would say about this initiative is that it is very clear on what it wants to strike down, but it's not particularly clear on what it wants to build and what it wants to accomplish as a whole for the Mexican people,” says Montserrat Ramiro, a former commissioner for the Energy Regulatory Commission, or CRE—one of the autonomous agencies that could meet its demise if the electricity reform passes.

That “if” is key. AMLO’s coalition doesn’t have the legislative seats needed to pass the reform on its own, though the president has sought to win over members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which was the very party that ushered in the landmark 2013 reform. Moreover, the reform could result in legal battles connected to the USMCA trade pact, explains Ramiro, who has held senior energy-focused roles at institutions such as the OECD and Mexican Institute for Competitiveness.

Even if the reform does not come to fruition, Ramiro expects AMLO will keep seeking ways to solidify a statist approach to the country’s energy sector. “I think he will just continue to say whatever is best for his political messaging, which he is a genius at—that is absolutely uncontroversial,” she says. “We will still be debating false accusations on either the energy companies or CFE itself and what our future is… And, and it will just keep on going until another government comes in.

AS/COA Online | LatAm in Focus: What’s on the Horizon for U.S.-Mexico Ties in a Biden Administration

As Joe Biden moves into the Oval Office, he’s made immigration a priority item for his administration. It’s also a top issue on the agenda for relations with Mexico—but it’s definitely not the only one.

In fact, during the waning days of the Donald Trump presidency, there were some bumps in the road when it came to his administration’s generally strong ties with the Mexican government. On January 15, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, or AMLO, released evidence from the U.S. investigation into Mexican former Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos and suggested the case was fabricated. Later that night, the U.S. Department of Justice defended the investigation and said Mexico violated a treaty by releasing the documents. The agency also expressed disappointment that Mexico wasn’t pursuing the case against the retired general.  

“I think this poses an interesting challenge for the Biden administration on what to do next,” says Dr. Sergio Alcocer, president of Mexico’s Council on Foreign Relations, or COMEXI, who explains that, with matters such as the Cienfuegos case, AMLO is making decisions with an eye toward his country’s midterm elections in June 2021 and bolstering his relationship with Mexico’s military. With that in mind, Alcocer suggests it could be hard to delve deep into solving tougher bilateral issues until Mexico’s electoral period concludes. Moreover, he notes that Biden and AMLO will have different approaches, with the incoming U.S. president focused on taking an active role on the global stage while his Mexican counterpart stays focused on issues at home. “López Obrador has said the best foreign policy is interior policy.”

"Probably—being very pragmatic, both of them—the best would be to meet at the border."

Alcocer, who served as deputy minister for North America in Mexico’s Foreign Ministry during the time Biden was vice president, shared insights for what both governments should expect in terms of working with each other. “Biden knows very well what's going on in Latin America,” he says, adding: “Mexico, in my opinion, needs to realize that the one that benefits the most with a good relation between the United States and Mexico, is Mexico.”

Given that AMLO rarely leaves his country, where will the two leaders first meet in person? Alcocer suggests a symbolic choice. “The best would be to meet at the border,” he says. “This would be a very interesting place for Biden to say, ‘We don't want a wall. We don't need a wall.’" 

AS/COA Online | LatAm in Focus: The Strange Case of El Salvador's Plummeting Homicide Rate

In the year since Nayib Bukele's June 2019 presidential inauguration, El Salvador's murder rate plunged, dropping by roughly 60 percent. That’s a major feat in a country that just five years ago had the highest homicide rate in the world. The precipitous drop in violence is one of the main factors fueling remarkably high approval ratings for Bukele, Latin America’s youngest head of state—a 39-year-old who campaigned as a Twitter-savvy outsider and ended the two-party grip on power dominating Salvadoran politics since the end of the country’s civil war.

Then, at the end of April 2020, murders once again spiraled out of control. With 85 homicides over the course of just five days, the government’s ability to keep the peace seemed vulnerable once again to the power plays of El Salvador’s gangs. The president acted swiftly, enforcing 24-hour lockdowns in prisons and welding metal sheets onto cell doors to prevent incarcerated gang members from communicating. Bukele also drew international attention and condemnation for tweeting photos of large numbers of imprisoned gang members locked together in human chains in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic.

It’s still a very fragile and very easily reversible equilibrium.

This kind of mano dura response to gangs predates the current government. “Before Bukele took the presidency…homicide levels were already on a downward trend, which was mainly due to basically all-out war that was waged by the state security forces against gangs, combined with very tough measures in prisons that hindered the communications between gangs in jails and outside jails,” Tiziano Breda, Central America analyst with the International Crisis Group (ICG), tells AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis.

Still, the rate has dropped to record lows under Bukele, with the government crediting its security strategy, known as the Territorial Control Plan. Breda expressed doubts, saying: “Most of the measures that have been taken resemble the attempts from previous administrations, which didn’t provide these stark and immediate results.”

So how did Bukele do it? In a July 2020 report titled Miracle or Mirage? Gangs and Plunging Gang Violence, the ICG suggests there are other reasons behind plummeting crime. “We think it’s more likely to be the gangs’ decision to scale back the use of violence…probably as part of an informal understanding between gangs and authorities,” says Breda. This wouldn’t be the first time a Salvadoran government negotiated a gang truce. The 2015 surge in violence took place after the last truce fell apart.But there are reasons why this time around provides a new opportunity, says Breda, who notes that Bukele’s popularity means he has a great deal of political capital to engage in dialogue with the gangs. To some degree there’s little choice; gangs are active in 90 percent of El Salvador and involve some 400,000 people in a country with a population of 6.5 million. Interacting with gangs is “unavoidable” on a local level even when entering or exiting communities, says Breda, who adds that how Bukele decides to wield his influence has much to do with him having an eye on next year’s legislative elections.

Available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Soundcloud, Spotify, and Stitcher.

Luisa Leme produced this episode.

AS/COA Online | LatAm in Focus: Shining a Light on Police Abuse in Mexico

Photo by C. Zissis

Photo by C. Zissis

Earlier this month, as demonstrators across the United States took to the streets in support of the Black Lives Matter movement and to oppose police violence, Mexico was witnessing protests of its own.

On May 4, police detained a construction worker named Giovanni López just outside of Guadalajara because he wasn’t wearing facemask amid the coronavirus pandemic. He later turned up dead, his body showing signs of torture. While the types of bodycams that have frequently exposed police violence in the United States are not widely used in Mexico, López’s family had recorded a video of the police taking him and they released it to the public in hopes of speeding justice. The video went viral in early June, and protests erupted, primarily in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Three municipal police officers were arrested for the extrajudicial killing.

The case of Giovanni López drew attention to a problem in Mexico’s criminal justice system: police abuse is highly prevalent and rarely reported, let alone investigated. A 2019 World Justice Project (WJP) Report based on a survey of nearly 52,000 people found that only about 10 percent of cases of police torture get reported in Mexico, while nearly 8 in 10 prison inmates experience some form of violence or ill treatment at the hands of police. Torture—which can range from a bag over the head, to threats against family members, to electroshocks, to sexual violence—is frequently used to extract confessions.

Mexico is using torture and ill treatment as investigative tools.

“Mexico is using torture and ill treatment as investigative tools,” the report’s co-author and WJP Senior Researcher Roberto Hernández told AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis. Hernández also co-directed the Emmy Award-winning film Presunto culpable (Presumed Guilty). On top of being Mexico’s most-watched documentary to date, the film exposed why the country’s criminal justice system so frequently leads to the conviction of innocent people and, after its theatrical release nearly a decade ago, helped usher in a judicial reform.

Hernández, who is also a lawyer, says there has been some progress in conjunction with the reform. For example, the system has shifted from a point in which only 7 percent of inmates say a judge was present in the courtroom to hear a case to one being present in most cases. In addition, he cites the example of a municipality called Escobedo in the northern state of Nuevo León that implemented successful policing practices, right down to using bodycams when making traffic stops, that reduced abuses. “I think it’s going to be these small examples of, if you will, islands of integrity that could set forth positive change and prove that it is possible to make these things happen in Mexico,” says Hernández.But, in the meantime, there is a lot of room for progress, from strengthening the public defense system to implementing a recommendation from Mexico’s human rights commission for police forces to use bodycams across the country. “The main problems, the persistent problems of Mexico’s criminal justice system are still there—the use of torture and ill treatment, the overuse of eyewitness testimony…the overuse of confessions,” says Hernández. “Mexico still has a long way to go.”

Available on Apple PodcastsGoogle PodcastsSoundcloudSpotifyand Stitcher.

Luisa Leme produced this episode.

AS/COA Online | LatAm in Focus: Jorge Castañeda Portends Changing Times for Mexico

What's the next step for Mexico in its 10-year-old drug war? What would it take to end the country’s corruption epidemic? And who will be the winner of the much-anticipated 2018 presidential election? Jorge Castañeda, a Mexican academic and former foreign secretary, spoke with AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis in Mexico City, sharing his answers to these questions and how they relate to a turbulent turn in U.S.-Mexican ties under the Trump administration.

For one thing, he says that Mexico does not have to help Washington carry out deportations and can block such moves by requiring the United States to prove deportees’ Mexican citizenship before repatriation. “Why should we let in people who they say are Mexicans, but who they cannot prove are Mexicans?” asks Castañeda, who served as a negotiator on U.S.-Mexico immigration reform during the government of Mexican President Vicente Fox. “This is an unfriendly American government. It makes no sense for Mexico to cooperate with them.”

Castañeda also says that Mexico’s next president would ideally be familiar with the United States and international issues, and who isn’t bogged down “by complicity with corruption of the past.” But, forecasting the winner, he says the 2018 election won’t deliver that result. “I think it will largely be a disaster,” he says. “But it’s a disaster waiting to happen.”

Read a transcript of this interview.

AS/COA Online | LatAm in Focus: Alejandro Hope on Drug Policy and Mexico's Marijuana Laws

Alejandro Hope, El Daily Post’s security editor, speaks with Carin Zissis about how national-level changes in drug policy in the Americas have an impact on global policy. He predicts a large portion of the legislation that underpins marijuana prohibition in Mexico today will eventually be declared unconstitutional.

“This region has been at the forefront of the reform process.” That’s what Alejandro Hope had to say about shifts toward more progressive drug policies in the Americas in recent years. Hope, a drug policy analyst and security editor at the Mexico City-based news site El Daily Post, spoke with AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis about what the region’s policy changes mean on a global scale as the UN prepares to host a special summit, known as UNGASS 2016, on the worldwide drug problem from April 19 to 21.

The General Assembly last held a special session in 2009 and another one wasn’t slated until 2019. But, in 2012, the presidents of Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico, tired of drug war violence, called to hold the summit sooner. But just because some countries are looking for a new path doesn’t mean UNGASS 2016 will produce major results: even if Latin American countries want more open policies, other parts of the world—such as Asia and Russia—take a more conservative stance.

Still, changes taking place on a national level have an impact on global policy. Hope notes that marijuana legalization by particular U.S. states weakens the ability to enforce drug control treaties, leaving “a gaping hole in the system.”

Shifting U.S. marijuana policy also has a direct effect on Mexico, where the illicit marijuana export market is showing signs it’s contracting as eradication and seizures decline. There’s a political effect as well: it’s harder for Mexico to maintain marijuana prohibition when the United States doesn’t, explains Hope. A Mexican Supreme Court decision in November, while limited in scope, opened the door to more progressive policies. “Marijuana legalization used to be a fringe concern,” he says. “It’s now part of the mainstream conversation.”

And Hope predicts court decisions will keep chipping away at prohibition as cases arise, saying: “I would argue that a large portion of the legislation that underpins marijuana prohibition in Mexico will be declared unconstitutional.”

What does this mean for Mexico’s next presidential election and security policy overall? Listen to find out.

AS/COA Online | Five Points on Mexico's El Chapo and the Repercussions of His Prison Escape

For the second time, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, head of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, made a dramatic getaway, escaping on the night of July 11 through an elaborate tunnel system below the maximum-security prison just west of Mexico City where he was being held.

AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis, based in Mexico City, talks with a former U.S. ambassador to Mexico and security expert about why Guzmán tops Mexico’s most wanted list, as well as the political repercussions of his escape.

1. Guzmán’s criminal syndicate has a transnational reach.

A farmer-turned-cartel leader, El Chapo (“Shorty”) famously acquired his nickname due to his height, or lack thereof. But that doesn’t mean he doesn’t still loom large as a cartel leader. Mexican magazine Nexos profiled him after his February 2014 capture in the Sinaloan resort town of Mazatlan, reporting that his cartel had the capacity to move 10,000 tons of marijuana—35 percent of the global supply—each month. His syndicate operates in 17 Mexican states and 54 countries. An in-depth 2012 article by The New York Times Magazine put conservative estimates of the Sinaloa Cartel’s share of the U.S. drug market at between 40 and 60 percent, giving it earnings that rivaled those of Netflix or Facebook.

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U.S. News & World Report | Learning from a Troubled Gang Truce

A wave of Central American children crossing the U.S. border caused President Barack Obama to label the crisis an “urgent humanitarian situation” earlier this month. With more than 50,000 unaccompanied minors making the dangerous journey since October last year, the tide of migration also draws attention to the crisis these children leave behind. Most come from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, a crime-addled area considered one of the most dangerous regions in the world.

But despite bleak crime figures, one country — El Salvador — experienced a notable drop in homicides after a 2012 gang truce. Over time, the agreement between the gangs Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 frayed and, last month, then-President Mauricio Funes declared the truce dead. His successor, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, has disavowed it as well. Still, the truce offers a chance to examine lessons learned in combating the violence leading young Central Americans to seek escape.

The agreement began in March 2012, when Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 leaders were transferred from maximum-security prisons to lowen security ones...

Read the full article in U.S. News & World Report's online opinion section.

AS/COA Online | El Salvador Update: Security Top Challenge as Sánchez Cerén Takes Office

Salvador Sánchez Cerén takes the helm as El Salvador’s new president on June 1, but his government will face the old problem of security as a major public concern. An uptick in violencemarked the period leading up to the former guerilla commander’s presidential inauguration. And although his soon-to-be-predecessor President Mauricio Funes leaves office with positive approval ratings, more than two-thirds of Salvadorans feel crime worsened under his watch.

Keeping a Gang Truce at Arm’s Length

For a period of Funes’ administration, El Salvador did see homicide rates drop. The national police reported that the murder rate decreased by 41 percent between 2012 and the prior year, and attributed the sharp decline to a truce between rival gangs Mara Salvatrucha (M-18) and Barrio 18. The agreement gained the support of the Organization of American States, while the Funes administration denied serving as an architect of the truce. But six months into the agreement, General and then-Justice Minister Munguía Payés admitted a direct role—though Funes continued to reject the idea that his government organized the deal, instead saying it served as a “facilitator.” Munguía Payés was removed from his post in May 2013 and, while total homicides remained lower in 2013 compared to 2012, the murder rate began to creep back up by the end of last year.
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AS/COA Online | Honduras Follows In El Salvador’s Footsteps, Declares Gang Truce

Leaders of Honduras’ two largest and most dangerous gangs announced a truce today during press conferences held in a San Pedro Sula prison. “We ask society and authorities to forgive us for the damage we have done,” said the head of the Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13, of the agreement forged with the 18th Street gang. Eight months in the making, the truce was mediated by Roman Catholic Bishop Romulo Emiliano, with the backing of the Organization of American States’ Secretary for Multidimensional Security Adam Blackwell. The Honduran president voiced his support on Monday. The deal gives a heavy nod to a gang truce negotiated last year in neighboring El Salvador. That truce led to a hefty reduction in homicides, an accomplishment that Honduras—with a murder rate 10 times the global average—hopes to emulate.

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AS/COA Online | Interview: El Salvador's Ambassador to the U.S. Rubén Zamora

“[W]e have started what we call the two-track policy—continuing with the fight against crime in the country by stage agencies, but at the same time, town by town, trying to develop conditions for preventing violence and reintegrating those people into society in a productive way.”

Appointed last month as the new Salvadoran ambassador in Washington, Rubén Zamora spoke with AS/COA Online’s Carin Zissis about the evolution of U.S.-Central American security policy in light of President Barack Obama’s recent trip to the region, saying: “Now the Obama administration is moving towards a more comprehensive approach, using the mantra, I would say, of partnership.” The ambassador also gave an overview of the Salvadoran government’s local strategies to drive down crime, as well as how to leverage initiatives such as the Partnership for Growth and CAFTA-DR. With a political career dating back to 1970, Zamora served twice as a legislative deputy in El Salvador’s National Assembly, was a member of the country’s Peace Commission, and ran, in 1994, as the first presidential candidate of the left’s coalition after the 1992 Peace Accords. More recently, he held the post of ambassador to India.

AS/COA Online: In light of U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent meeting with leaders in Costa Rica, including with President of El Salvador Mauricio Funes, what were some of the accomplishments? And what more do you think should have been done?

Ambassador Zamora: For us, the meeting between President Obama and the seven Central American and Caribbean head of states was important because we learned about U.S. foreign policy on Central America. The discussion was very frank among the presidents and it was clear for us—and this seems to me an important achievement—that President Obama clearly was for a more integrated approach to the question of security. That was one of the main issues in the talks among the heads of states. We had mostly been used to the United States insisting more and more on the question of controlling crime; that is necessary, but is very insufficient to achieve results. Now, it seems to me, Washington is having a more comprehensive, holistic approach to the problem that we are facing in Central America, both in terms of the crime and in terms of Central America being a region through which South American drugs travel to the United States.

AS/COA Online: In connection with that, I wanted to ask about CARSI [Central America Regional Security Initiative]. In March, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs William R. Brownfield gave remarks at our organization, and he said: “What we are doing today is actually very different from what we thought we were going to be doing four years ago.” What do you think needs to happen to improve security cooperation on a regional level? And how would you suggest that CARSI could evolve further?

Zamora: The starting point now is that the best strategic view when it comes to security in Central America, especially in the northern part—that means Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—is that you have to attack the problem with a two or three-track policy. You cannot do it just with a single line of policy, or the tactic of controlling crime without addressing the question of the rehabilitation of gang members into mainstream society...

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AS/COA Online | Gun Laws in Mexico

Excerpt from Explainer: Gun Laws in Latin America’s Six Largest Economies, co-authored with David Gacs and Rachel Glickhouse. Republished in VOXXI. Led to interview with Fox News Latino.

Although Mexicans have a constitutional right to own guns, one obstacle limits gun purchases: there is only one gun store in the country, located in Mexico City. Still, Mexico ranks seventh worldwide in terms of the number of privately owned guns and violence stemming from a battle against organized crime in recent years has raised concerns about gun smuggling, particularly from the United States.

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AS/COA Online | Pérez Molina Takes the Helm in Guatemala

For the first time since Guatemala’s return to democracy, an ex-general took the presidential helm on January 14. “Change has arrived,” said new President Otto Pérez Molina during his inauguration. He also acknowledged that he enters office at a time when the country faces “many problems and enormous challenges.” Pérez Molina of the Patriotic Party won a November runoff election with the promise of a mano dura—or iron fist—to fight criminality and rein in the country’s high murder rate. His inaugural speech urged Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and particularly the United States to step up cooperation in the fight against organized crime. Guatemala’s high poverty rate and economic concerns will be crucial issues for the administration as well. But, with over two-thirds of Guatemalans viewing violence as the country’s top problem, combating crime will be at the top of Pérez Molina’s agenda. How will he balance these challenges with his military past?

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AS/COA Online - Colombia Takes out Top FARC Leader Alfonso Cano

The Colombian military took out a series of top guerrilla leaders in the past few years, but yesterday’s assassination of Alfonso Cano marked the first time the government either caught or killed the top leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Born Guillermo León Sáenz but known most commonly by his FARC battle name, Cano died in a bombing raid carried out in the Cauca province, according to official reports. Rumors of his death began to swirl in the afternoon of November 4, but it wasn’t until the early hours of the following morning—after official reports that Cano’s identity was confirmed through fingerprints—that President Juan Manuel Santos delivered remarks announcing the death. “I want to send a message to each and every member of this organization: demobilize,” said Santos in the televised address. “Because if you don't, as we've said so many times and as we've shown, you will end up in jail or in a tomb.” Still, the president warned against celebrating victory until peace breaks through the struggle against the guerrillas that’s now over four decades old. The FARC has seen its numbers dwindle, and much of its leadership crushed. So how much closer does Cano’s death bring the conflict to a close?
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AS/COA Online - New U.S. Measures Seek to Stem Arms Trafficking into Mexico

The Obama administration announced Monday new rules requiring increased reporting about semi-automatic weapons sales in Southwest border states. Firearms dealers in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas will be required to report when making a sale, within five business days, of more than one semiautomatic rifle greater than .22 caliber and with detachable magazines. Such weapons include AK-47s U.S. Department of Justice Deputy Attorney General James Cole heralded the new rules as a tool for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) “to help confront the problem of illegal gun trafficking into Mexico and along the Southwest Border.” But the new rules could force the White House into a legal tussle with the National Rifle Association (NRA), an organization dedicated to gun ownership rights. The move also comes amid a simmering scandal over the ATF’s botched gun-tracing operation dubbed “Fast and Furious” that allowed U.S. weapons to fall into the hands of Mexican drug gangs.

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AS/COA Online - U.S.-Mexican Summit Surveys Next Steps on Security

Co-authored with Roque Planas.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hosts her Mexican counterpart Patricia Espinosa on April 29 in a summit focusing on bilateral cooperation to combat organized crime. It counts as the third by the Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group, but the first since a diplomatic hiccup set off by a leaked cable in which the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual questioned the efficacy of the Mexican government’s struggle against cartels. Close to the time that Pascual resigned in March, news came to light of a U.S. operation called “Fast and Furious” that aimed to take down cartels by tracking guns smuggled into Mexico. The only problem was that the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives lost track of some of those weapons, raising questions about the hands the guns fell into at a time when Mexico faces a brutal drug war that has claimed over 37,000 lives. Now newly leaked cables indicate Mexico may have to look to its southern border as well to stem the illicit influx of weapons, with signs that guns may be flowing in from Central America.

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AS/COA Online - Exclusive Interview: Governor Bill Richardson on Washington's Latin American Ties

“It’s not going to be easy, but I believe we need that comprehensive immigration bill more than anything or the country is going to be torn apart.”


Governor Bill Richardson (D-NM) spoke with AS/COA Online Managing Editor Carin Zissis about Washington’s Latin American ties, saying, “It’s our own region and if I might say so, we’ve kind of neglected it in a bipartisan way.” The former U.S. ambassador to the UN discussed the need for a hemispheric accord on transnational crime as well as the shifting U.S.-Cuban relationship, which he called “the best that I’ve seen in a long time.” But he cautioned that movement on trade deals and immigration reform may have to wait until next year. “What you will see if there isn’t bipartisan, comprehensive [immigration] reform is more patchwork laws like Arizona’s, which are not just unconstitutional—they’re very discriminatory, they’re divisive,” he said. He added: “They hurt our foreign policy relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean.”

AS/COA Online: To start off, I’d like to talk about Mexico. The Obama administration has referred to a “shared responsibility” in the fight against organized crime in Mexico. As a border-state governor who also has a personal connection to Mexico, if you had to name one area for the U.S. to prioritize in its policy toward Mexico’s security situation, what would it be?

Gov. Richardson: It would be in the area of more shared intelligence with Mexico, and secondly, more cooperation in the area of restricting automatic weapons going into Mexico—a cooperative effort that I believe can be improved. On the issue of shared intelligence, it’s going to mean our joint security operations not just having more opportunities to do training and law enforcement activities. I support the Merida Initiative’s plan makes of additional helicopters. But we have to more effectively share intelligence, especially on the Mexican side.

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AS/COA Online - Measuring Mexico's Bicentennial Mood

Mexico celebrates its bicentennial this week amid a glut of pulse-taking media coverage reflecting on the country’s mood. As Mexicans prepare for the September 15 grito—the shout marking the climax of Independence Day festivities—the country celebrates its birthday but mourns the more than 28,000 lives claimed over the past four years by the drug war. A week before party time, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton caused a stir when she commented on Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s war against organized crime, saying Mexico is “looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago” and compared the cartels’ strength to an “insurgency.” Her remarks drew criticism from the Mexican government and some observers, forcing U.S. President Barack Obama to smooth over the controversy. In an interview with La Opinión, Obama described Mexico as a “progressive democracy and, as a result, you cannot compare what is happening in Mexico with what happened in Colombia 20 years ago.”
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AS/COA Online | Security and Immigration Frame Calderón's DC Visit

President of Mexico Felipe Calderón pays a visit to Washington this week amid ongoing drug-war worries and rising U.S. tensions over immigration. In his first state visit to Washington since his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama took office, Calderón will also address a joint session of Congress. He is expected to stress bilateral responsibility in combating organized crime and cartel-related bloodshed in Mexico. But controversy over Arizona’s passage of immigration legislation SB1070 has pushed immigration higher up Calderón’s agenda as well. Moreover, with Mexico’s financial health tied to that of its northern neighbor, the visit will also focus on bilateral trade and economic cooperation, particularly a dispute over a cross-border trucking plan.

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